

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

May 11, 1977

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Presidential Directive / NSC

TO: The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense

ALSO: The Director, Office of Management and Budget
The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
The Director, Office of Science and Technology Policy
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Administrator, Energy Research and Development Administration

SUBJECT: Negotiations with the Soviets on Termination of Nuclear Explosions

Having reviewed the response to Presidential Review Memorandum NSC-16, I would like to initiate negotiation of a multilateral treaty to ban nuclear explosions. The US delegation for these negotiations will be chaired by the Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, with representatives from State, Defense, the Energy Research and Development Administration, and other agencies as appropriate, under the general supervision of the NSC Special Coordinating Committee.

As the first step in these negotiations, the US should seek agreement with the Soviet Union on the key elements of a multilateral treaty that would embody a comprehensive prohibition on nuclear explosions in all environments. With Soviet concurrence, the United Kingdom should

State Department review completed. Referral to PFIAB or NSC not required.

[continued]

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be invited to participate in these negotiations as early as feasible. The US position should include the following points:

- The treaty's entry into force should not require the adherence of France or the People's Republic of China.
- In addition to a "supreme interests" withdrawal clause, there should be provision for a review conference with the option to withdraw from the treaty after a period of about five years.
- The treaty should prohibit nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes as well as for nuclear weapon tests.

With regard to verification of the agreement, the US position should be that the treaty should provide for monitoring of compliance through national technical means of verification augmented by international exchange of seismic data. In addition, the initial US position should include ~~consideration of~~ measures ^{to} [which might] supplement these provisions, such as:

- Installation of unmanned, tamper-detecting seismometers on US and Soviet territory; and
- On-site inspections at the location of questionable events, which could be requested by any party or by a fact-finding consultative committee of treaty parties.

The US Delegation should propose that once agreement is reached on key elements of a multilateral treaty, the USSR, US and UK should refer these elements to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament for negotiation of an appropriate treaty text, and jointly announce that each would refrain from conducting any nuclear explosions during the period of negotiation of this multilateral treaty.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 13, 1977

Dear Paul:

When you meet with the Soviets June 13-17 to initiate discussions on a ban on nuclear explosions, I would like you to take the following exploratory approach:

- Describe our objectives in seeking a multilateral treaty to ban nuclear explosions, with primary emphasis on the contribution such a ban could make to curbing proliferation of nuclear weapons and toward the ultimate abolition of all nuclear weapons.
- Propose a procedural approach involving US-USSR-UK meetings to reach agreement on key elements, which would then be jointly referred to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament for negotiation of an appropriate treaty text.
- Make clear the US position that the treaty should prohibit nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes as well as for nuclear weapon tests, and that the treaty's entry into force should not require the adherence of France or the People's Republic of China.
- Indicate our view that, in addition to a "supreme interest" withdrawal clause, there should be provision for a review conference with the option to withdraw from the treaty after a period of about five years.
- Make clear the importance the US attaches to adequate verification, and, in that context, refer in general terms to the possible utility of such verification means as international exchange of seismic data, unattended seismometers, and on-site inspections at the location of questionable events.

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
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- Explore Soviet views on the above subjects; and, on a private basis, explore their views on the desirability of suspending nuclear explosions at an early stage of the CTB negotiations.

I will want to review the results of these exploratory talks before making further decisions on these issues.

Sincerely,




The Honorable Paul Warnke
Director
US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Washington, D.C. 20520

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON



MEMORANDUM FOR:

June 18, 1977

The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense

ALSO: The Director, Office of Science and
Technology Policy
The Director, Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Administrator, Energy Research
and Development Administration

SUBJECT: Preparations for Trilateral Comprehensive
Test Ban Negotiations

The SCC Working Group on a Comprehensive Test Ban should review our bilateral discussions with the Soviets and analyze key issues raised in these discussions in preparation for our trilateral negotiations with the UK and USSR, beginning on July 13 in Geneva. The paper should be forwarded for review by SCC principals by June 24, 1977 and should include analyses of:

- The contribution of unmanned seismic stations to our national technical means, including a preliminary assessment of the number of such stations that would be needed and their approximate cost.
- Planned and foreseeable improvements in our national technical means, their approximate cost, and the degree to which they would offset or complement the contribution of unmanned seismic stations.
- The Soviet verification proposals, including in particular an examination of the utility and verifiability of the Soviet proposals for eliminating military benefits in conducting PNEs.

Zbigniew Brzezinski

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NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD

NFIB-32.1/20

23 June 1977

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MEMORANDUM FOR NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD

FROM :

[Redacted]

SUBJECT : (S) Comprehensive Test Ban Verification

1. (SNF) Attached for your information is a memorandum from the Chairman on the subject which establishes a working group and directs that group to report to NFIB on the two tasks outlined in paragraph 3.

NFIB ACTION REQUESTED

2. (C) You are requested to notify [Redacted] as soon as possible who your representative to the working group will be. Please note the date of the group's first meeting has been changed. It is now scheduled for Tuesday, 28 June from 0930 to 1230 hours in Room 1S06, Community Headquarters Building.

[Redacted]

Attachment
As Stated

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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category 5B(1),(2),(3)
Automatically declassified on
Date Impossible to Determine

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NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD

Attachment to NFIB-
32.1/20
23 June 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: National Foreign Intelligence Board

FROM: Stansfield Turner
Chairman

SUBJECT: Comprehensive Test Ban Verification

1. The United States and the Soviet Union have begun preliminary discussions concerning the negotiation of a multilateral treaty to terminate nuclear testing, as proposed by the President. The significantly expanded dimension of this treaty, over that of the Limited Test Ban Treaty currently in effect, will increase the scope and complexity of the responsibilities assigned to the Director of Central Intelligence and bring into focus the issue of appropriate roles and missions within the Community.

2. In order to ensure that the Intelligence Community can assume these increased responsibilities, I have established an interagency CTB Intelligence Working Group, to be chaired by a member of the Intelligence Community Staff. Interested members are invited to designate to my Acting Deputy for the Intelligence Community (Point of Contact:) a representative to this group. The first meeting of the Working Group will convene at the Community Headquarters Building on 23 June 1977.

3. I am directing that this Working Group prepare a report for the NFIB no later than 15 August 1977 on the following two tasks:

--Task 1: The CTB Intelligence Working Group is to examine in depth the appropriate roles and missions of the DCI and the Community agencies and organizations in the monitoring and verification of the proposed CTB. This examination should address the capabilities of and the interrelationship among Community elements as well as the

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interface of these elements with other government agencies and organizations, and should present issues and options for subsequent NFIB consideration.

--Task 2: The CTB Intelligence Working Group is to determine the requirements for intelligence in support of CTB verification, to identify the resulting intelligence collection, analysis, and reporting needs; to analyze current and planned intelligence capabilities in order to identify deficiencies; to address the relationship between CTB and nuclear proliferation intelligence activities; to recommend improvements in intelligence capabilities and procedures; and to propose options for the coordination or management of interagency CTB monitoring functions.



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STANSFIELD TURNER

(22 June 1977)

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